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Working Relationships 
Laura A. Rosenbury  
Work has long been a site of friendship, but the financial crisis of 
the late 2000s highlights the importance of work friendships, both to 
individual employees and the economy at large. As employees are 
laid off, they lose not just paychecks and job security but also the 
daily support of coworkers.
1
 Employees left behind also lose that 
support while coping with anxiety over the possibility of additional 
layoffs and new workplace social dynamics. At the same time, 
government efforts to stimulate the economy have relied on the 
advice and expertise of economists, bankers, and financial advisers 
who have often previously worked together in the private sector.
2
 In 
turn, the strategies they develop have benefited former co-workers 
and partners at investment banks like Goldman Sachs.
3
  
Legislators and legal scholars have largely ignored such ties 
arising from workplace interactions. Instead, law has long located 
personal relationships in the home, recognizing and explicitly 
regulating them only to the extent that they occur within the domestic 
sphere. Historically, law did this by establishing special rules, 
collected under the umbrella of domestic relations law, governing a 
range of relationships thought to occur within the home, including the 
relationships of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and 
ward, master and servant, and master and slave.
4
 This domestic 
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Newman, Natalie Pierce, Noah Zatz, and Emily Zoellner, and the students in my short course 
on Relationships at Work at UCLA Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., Catherine Bergart, Losing the Income, and the Camaraderie, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2009, at BU10. 
 2. See Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from “Government Sachs,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2008, at BU1.  
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, 
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relations umbrella originally acknowledged that both intimacy and 
production occurred and mixed within the home, but over time the 
legal home was purged of its overtly productive aspects. Legal 
recognition of the master-slave relationship was abolished, the 
master-servant relationship was moved under the umbrella of 
employment law, and the guardian-ward relationship was subsumed 
within the rules pertaining to the parent-child relationship in general, 
leaving only spousal and parent-child relationships under the newly 
named umbrella of family law.
5
  
This realignment solidified the legal home as a site of pure 
intimacy rather than production. The domestic relationship in which 
intimacy and commerce most explicitly mixed—the master-servant 
relationship—came to be governed by rules pertaining to the 
workplace.
6
 Thus, the master-servant relationship is now assumed to 
be productive rather than intimate, even when the workplace is also a 
home. 
The legal assignment of intimacy to the home and production to 
the workplace masks various dynamics within the home, the 
workplace, and spaces in between. As numerous scholars have 
illustrated, a focus on the intimacy of the home can obscure the 
violence and alienation of the home, as well as the productive work 
that takes place within it.
7
 In addition, as I have previously argued,
8
 
family law‘s focus on the home ignores intimacy outside of the home, 
 
GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF 
CHANCERY (Lucius E. Chittenden ed., 2d ed. 1846). 
 5. See, e.g., Martha Minow, ―Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:” Toward a 
History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 825 (pointing out that inclusion of master-
servant relationships in early domestic relations treatises ―suggests how the conception of 
family or domestic life has changed historically‖). 
 6. For detailed discussions of the transformations in master-servant law, see AMY DRU 
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN 
THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 60–97, 175–217 (1998); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, 
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 223–92 (1993).  
 7. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (1994) (illustrating various ways that the state has been 
complicit in domestic violence); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. 
REV. 973 (1991) (examining how constitutional notions of privacy have permitted and at times 
encouraged violence against women in the home); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into 
Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing how law ignores the 
productive nature of home labor). 
 8. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
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particularly the intimacy that occurs between friends providing a 
range of care, support, and companionship to one another. Family 
law‘s silence about friendship does not mean that friendship is 
unregulated, however. The conferral of explicit legal status on 
spousal and family relationships to the exclusion of other 
relationships instead shapes understandings of both family and 
friendship, challenging the notion that family law only affects the 
domestic sphere.
9
  
In this Essay I extend my previous consideration of friendship to 
the specific context of the workplace, analyzing friendship through 
the lens of the ties that arise at work instead of those assumed to arise 
within the home. Many adults spend half or more of their waking 
hours at work, in the process forming relationships with supervisors, 
co-workers, subordinates, customers, and other third parties. 
Although such relationships are at times primarily transactional, at 
other times they take on intimate qualities similar to those of family 
relationships or friendships. Workplaces are thus often sites of both 
intimacy and production, much like the home is a site of both 
intimacy and production, even though the law assigns production to 
the workplace and intimacy to the home.  
Moreover, friendships and other ties in the workplace are often a 
component of workplace success rather than a simple byproduct of 
that success or a negative distraction from it. Workplace friendships 
foster connections that may lead to promotions and higher status, and 
such connections may also provide care and support to workers in 
increasingly uncertain and competitive workplace environments. 
Some legal scholars have categorized these effects as ―favoritism‖ 
and have considered ways to eliminate that favoritism in order to 
promote meritocracy and antidiscrimination goals in the workplace. 
This Essay takes a different tack, examining relationships in the 
workplace to challenge legal understandings of both work and family, 
particularly the assumption that purported merit-based success can be 
separated from intimacy or care. Part I examines the ways that 
current legal analysis largely ignores relationships at work or 
constructs them solely as threats to workplace equality. Part II draws 
 
 9. See id. at 202–03.  
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on social science literature to illustrate that personal relationships are 
neither irrelevant to the workplace nor always at odds with 
antidiscrimination goals, even as they may replicate patterns of 
inequality not currently addressed by antidiscrimination law. Part III 
then sets forth an agenda for future legal consideration of affective 
bonds at work that does not collapse work relationships into family, 
or define them against family, but instead examines the flow of 
intimacy in and out of the home, the workplace, and other spaces 
both public and private, and productive and intimate. 
I. RELATIONSHIPS AND WORKPLACE LAW  
Law currently addresses personal relationships in the workplace in 
two primary ways. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
unwelcome sexual or romantic attention between supervisors and 
employees, or between co-workers, may constitute sexual harassment 
that violates Title VII if sufficiently severe or pervasive.
10
 In turn, 
many employers have promulgated policies banning or regulating all 
sexual or romantic relationships at work for fear that even consensual 
romantic or sexual relationships might subject employers to sexual 
harassment liability, particularly once those relationships end.
11
 As 
such, by targeting sexual relationships as a particularly likely source 
of workplace discrimination, the law has separated sexual 
relationships from other relationships at work and provided 
employers with incentives to monitor and regulate them.  
 
 10. Title VII provides, in relevant part: ―It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2011). The Supreme Court has held that harassment 
because of sex is a form of discrimination because of sex. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 
542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). A few lower courts have extended this 
analysis to unwelcome behavior occurring after the conclusion of a consensual sexual or 
romantic relationship between an accused harasser and alleged victim. See, e.g., Forrest v. 
Brinker Int‘l Payroll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 11. See generally Ian J. Silverbrand, Workplace Romance and the Economic Duress of 
Love Contract Policies, 54 VILL. L. REV. 155 (2009) (examining employer responses to 
workplace romance).  
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At the same time, workplace law has largely placed other personal 
relationships at work outside of the domain of explicit legal 
regulation.
12
 This second indirect consideration of workplace 
relationships affects workplace ties by not providing incentives for 
employers to regulate them. Federal courts have consistently held that 
employment preferences for friends and acquaintances,
13
 family 
members,
14
 or lovers
15
 generally do not constitute prohibited 
discrimination but instead are forms of favoritism legitimately within 
employers‘ prerogatives. Employers may still choose to implement 
antinepotism or antifraternization policies aimed at purging 
employment decisions of favoritism based on personal ties,
16
 and 
courts have upheld such policies against constitutional challenges in 
the public employment context.
17
 However, courts have not required 
 
 12. This placement of personal relationships outside of the domain of legal regulation is 
particularly true of employment discrimination law. As discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 16–17, civil service laws do seek to regulate some personal relationships through 
antinepotism laws. In addition, labor law facilitates and regulates interactions between groups 
of employees. In future work, I will analyze the connections between personal relationships at 
work and employee solidarity.  
 13. These cases make up a small portion of total Title VII cases, but the outcomes across 
circuits are remarkably consistent. See Greene v. Potter, 557 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Harris v. Hays, 452 F.3d 714, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2006) (Gibson, J., concurring); Neal v. Roche, 
349 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003); Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 723 
(4th Cir. 2002); Brandt v. Shop ‗n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935, 938–39 (8th Cir. 
1997); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1995); Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 845 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Autry v. N.C. Dep‘t of Human Res., 820 F.2d 1384, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987); Rapp v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Housley v. Boeing Co., 177 F. 
Supp. 2d 1209, 1217 (D. Kan. 2001).  
 14. There are even fewer cases alleging favoritism toward family members, but the 
outcomes of these cases are consistent with the outcomes in cases alleging favoritism toward 
friends and acquaintances. See, e.g., Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 
905 (11th Cir. 1990); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 826–27 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 15. The outcomes of these cases are also remarkably consistent with those alleging 
favoritism toward friends or family. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern AG Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 
(8th Cir. 2006); Preston v. Wis. Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005); Ackel v. Nat‘l 
Commc‘ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003); Schobert v. Ill. Dep‘t of Transp., 304 F.3d 
725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002); Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 862 (3d Cir. 1990); DeCintio v. Westchester 
Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 826 F. Supp. 
443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 16. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 523 F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that violation of employer‘s anti-fraternization policy was a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for plaintiff‘s discharge). 
 17. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 711–12 (6th Cir. 2001). 
Civil service laws may even require public employers to adopt such antinepotism policies. 
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public or private employers to implement such policies; employers 
may therefore take personal relationships into account when making 
employment-related decisions.
18
  
For example, the First Circuit upheld a district court‘s finding that 
an employer‘s decision to hire an employee‘s white male ―fishing 
buddy‖ rather than an African-American woman ―was a near-classic 
case of an old boy network in operation, but not a situation in which 
the employment decision was motivated by racial animus.‖19 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that a district court properly 
granted judgment as a matter of law to the employer in a sex 
discrimination case because the evidence established that a supervisor 
―manipulated the overtime procedures in order to benefit a few of his 
friends, not out of a desire to discriminate against female 
employees.‖20 In yet another case, the Eighth Circuit simply stated 
that ―it is not intentional sex discrimination . . . to hire an 
unemployed old friend who happens to be male, without considering 
an applicant who is neither unemployed nor an old friend and 
happens to be female.‖21 Courts have reached the same result when 
supervisors favor their lovers, admitting that such decisions are 
―unfair,‖22 but concluding, for example, that ―when an employer 
discriminates in favor of a paramour, such an action is not sex-based 
discrimination, as the favoritism, while unfair, disadvantages both 
 
However, employers may not use such policies to interfere with employees‘ rights to engage in 
union and other concerted activity, including the right to discuss terms and conditions of 
employment for the employees‘ mutual benefit, or to discriminate against union members. See, 
e.g., Spencer Foods, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1483, 1485–86 (1984) (partially overruled on other 
grounds). In addition, some commentators have argued that antinepotism policies violate Title 
VII because they have a disparate impact on women, given that wives tend to earn less than 
their husbands and have less seniority. See, e.g., Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The 
Uneasy Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REV. 75, 79 (1982). A few courts have agreed. 
See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 322, 331–32 (8th Cir. 1986). However, 
most courts have disagreed, either finding no disparate impact or concluding that the policy was 
job-related and consistent with business necessity. See, e.g., Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 
Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 614–18 (11th Cir. 1995); Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509–
11 (10th Cir. 1987); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412–14 (8th Cir. 
1975).  
 18. See cases cited supra notes 13–15. 
 19. Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 20. Greene v. Potter, 557 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 21. Brandt v. Shop ‗n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 22. DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/7
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sexes alike for reasons other than gender.‖23 Indeed, one court 
stressed that employment preferences based upon personal 
relationships of any type are generally outside of law‘s reach: 
―Whether the employer grants employment perks to an employee 
because she is a protégé, an old friend, a close relative or a love 
interest, that special treatment is permissible as long as it is not based 
on an impermissible classification.‖24 Pursuant to all of these cases, 
so long as the favoritism is directed toward individuals instead of 
groups, or is isolated instead of widespread, employers may take 
personal ties into account when making various employment 
decisions.
25
  
Some legal scholars, most notably Mary Anne Case, have 
criticized law‘s deference to employers‘ reliance on personal ties 
when making employment decisions. Case argues that preferences for 
friends and lovers at work can thwart antidiscrimination goals 
because workplace decision-makers tend to ―like,‖ whether sexually 
or not, members of a particular gender or other protected category.
26
 
In particular, in Case‘s view, relationships between people who are 
hierarchically arranged at work are problematic because such 
relationships are often available to some but not others on the basis of 
gender, race, or religion. The cost of such potentially discriminatory 
effects is too high to justify whatever benefits such relationships 
 
 23. Ackel v. Nat‘l Commc‘ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Green v. 
Adm‘rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 24. Schobert v. Ill. Dep‘t of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 25. When favoritism spreads from isolated instances to widespread practice, courts have 
found impermissible discrimination. See, e.g., Miller v. Dep‘t of Corrections, 115 P.3d 77, 80 
(Cal. 2005) (concluding that widespread sexual favoritism may create a hostile work 
environment because ―the demeaning message is conveyed to female employees that they are 
viewed by management as ‗sexual playthings‘ or that the way required for women to get ahead 
in the workplace is by engaging in sexual conduct with their supervisors or the management‖); 
EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC 
Notice 915.048, 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 615 (Jan. 12, 1990) (setting forth guidelines 
that were subsequently endorsed by the Miller court, 115 P.3d at 88–90). 
 26. Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the 
Workplace, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, 
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 153, 156–58 (Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson 
& Adam P. Romero eds., 2009). For an earlier analysis and proposal similar to Case‘s, see Joan 
E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under Title VII for Workplace Sexual Favoritism, 13 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 153 (1991). 
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between hierarchically arranged employees might confer, Case 
maintains, therefore justifying a ban on supervisors‘ preferences for 
friends and lovers and, in some situations, justifying a ban on 
relationships between hierarchically arranged employees altogether.
27
 
Case therefore prioritizes a broad interpretation of antidiscrimination 
law over employer prerogatives or the potential benefits of workplace 
relationships for employees and employers alike.  
Other scholars agree that preferences for friends and lovers may 
mask subtle discrimination, but they focus less on using existing 
antidiscrimination law to eliminate such preferences. Instead, these 
scholars emphasize that such preferences may be influenced by 
implicit bias, and they focus on developing strategies to reduce that 
bias outside of antidiscrimination law.
28
 Vicki Schultz is unique 
within this group, as she advocates structural reforms designed to 
eliminate workplace bias, primarily through eliminating forms of job 
segregation, while also acknowledging the benefits that may flow 
from relationships at work.
29
 Schultz agrees with Case that both 
sexual and nonsexual relationships at work can lead to discriminatory 
favoritism, but she argues against bans on sexual conduct and 
fraternization in the workplace.  
Schultz writes, for example:  
[T]he problem of favoritism cannot be solved by an 
antifraternization rule alone. Approaching the problem that 
way singles out sexual relationships in a way that obscures the 
exclusionary dynamics that often underlie other personal 
 
 27. Case, supra note 26, at 154–58. 
 28. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of 
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1929–30, 
1956–71 (2009) (arguing that legal coercion is unlikely to reduce implicit bias and instead 
proposing reforms designed to increase employers‘ motivations to act in nondiscriminatory 
ways); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) (―In the end, because implicit biases draw on widely shared 
cultural understandings, any effort to eliminate those biases requires a massive, society-wide 
effort to change the significance of race and gender in our culture.‖); Barbara Reskin, 
Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 315–16 (2002) 
(arguing that structural workplace reforms are necessary because ―the good intentions of 
workplace decisionmakers are not sufficient to prevent the discriminatory results of cognitive 
biases‖). 
 29. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/7
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affiliations. Under my approach, the law would treat sexual 
and nonsexual forms of intimacy (and exclusion) alike. This 
does not imply that organizations should ban all forms of 
contact and intimacy—both sexual and nonsexual—between 
their employees. But it does mean that organizations should 
take more seriously the potential for discriminatory dynamics 
to develop in connection with nonsexual forms of affiliation 
between supervisors and their employees, or between 
coworkers who can affect each other‘s employment 
prospects.
30
  
In other words, playing golf with a boss may lead to as much 
favoritism as having sex with a boss.
31
 If an employer bans sexual 
relationships between hierarchically arranged employees but permits 
golf and other activities between such employees, then female 
subordinates are likely to be disproportionately harmed in a 
workplace with overwhelmingly male supervisors.
32
 Male 
subordinates may use their generally superior golf skills to make 
connections with male supervisors, whereas female subordinates will 
be denied the opportunity to make use of their sexuality to make 
connections with those supervisors (an opportunity that might 
otherwise be available if the female subordinates were willing to 
adopt a heterosexual performance).  
Therefore, although Schultz and Case agree that sexual 
relationships at work are not meaningfully different from other 
personal relationships at work, they draw opposite conclusions. Case 
employs law‘s regulation of sexual relationships at work to challenge 
law‘s deference to other forms of relationships between hierarchically 
arranged employees. Schultz, in contrast, employs law‘s deference 
toward nonsexual favoritism to challenge what she considers to be 
law‘s over-regulation of sexual relationships at work and the 
corresponding under-regulation of gender segregation.  
Schultz justifies her conclusion by relying on the fact that work is 
an increasingly important site for personal interaction and support.
33
 
 
 30. Id. at 2189. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2186–90; see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We tend 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As such, some workplace relationships have come to resemble 
relationships found within the home, voluntary associations, and the 
like. Law permits dating, friendship, favoritism, and even bias in 
those contexts.
34
 Schultz argues that law also should permit dating, 
friendship, favoritism, and bias in the workplace so long as they are 
motivated by affective ties rather than discriminatory animus.
35
 In 
other words, law‘s treatment of the affective relationships should not 
change simply because the location of the relationships has changed.  
This focus on the nature of the relationship rather than its location 
in some ways reflects arguments made in opposition to the bill that 
became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, some opponents of 
the proposed text of Title VII of the Act argued that employers 
should enjoy the same rights of intimate association that home and 
apartment dwellers enjoy.
36
 Congress eventually reached a 
compromise, exempting employers with fewer than fifteen employees 
from Title VII‘s reach on the theory that smaller employers were 
more like families or other intimate associations.
37
 In no way does 
 
these days, far more than in earlier times, to find our friends, lovers, and even mates in the 
workplace.‖). Moreover, Schultz elsewhere argues that workplace isolation, including but not 
necessarily limited to the deprivation of training and feedback, may in fact constitute a hostile 
work environment. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1687, 1771–72 (1998). 
 34. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the 
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (analyzing discrimination in 
personal relationships and advocating for increased legal attention to such intimate 
discrimination without legally prohibiting it).  
 35. Schultz, supra note 29, at 2188–90.  
 36. See H.R. Rep. 88–914 (1963), reprinted in U.S. Equal Emp‘t. Opportunity Comm‘n., 
Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2064–65 (Minority 
Report upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary Substitute for H.R. 
7152) (1968). Congress and courts have consistently rejected such arguments since the passage 
of Title VII. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (―[T]he Constitution 
undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State‘s power to control the selection of one‘s spouse 
that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of one‘s fellow employees.‖). But some 
scholars continue to argue that Title VII violates employers‘ associational rights. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert 
Libertarianism of the United States Supreme Court, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 75, 81 (2004) 
(―[T]he effort to impose a general antidiscrimination law such as Title VII fails to meet 
constitutional standards because it violates the general norm of free association, albeit with less 
severe consequences, every bit as much as a law that might mandate forced marriage.‖). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Similar reasoning has long exempted domestic workers 
from various workplace protections. See Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: 
Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1835, 1841 (2007) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/7
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Schultz argue that this exemption should be expanded, but her 
arguments do call for an acknowledgment of the potentially intimate 
nature of work, even for larger employers.
38
 Although Title VII‘s 
fifteen-employee threshold could be interpreted as separating the 
solely productive workplaces from the ones that are simultaneously 
productive and intimate, Schultz‘s argument relies on a rejection of 
that interpretation. Unlike Title VII‘s early opponents, Schultz 
supports the goals of workplace antidiscrimination law while also 
emphasizing that such goals should not, and cannot, purge the 
workplace of the intimacy that many individual employees 
experience and value as they go about accomplishing their workplace 
tasks.
39
 
Other legal scholars have also recognized the value of 
relationships that exist at work, but have done so because such 
relationships possess value beyond that experienced by the individual 
employees involved.
40
 Cynthia Estlund, in particular, celebrates the 
ties and friendships that develop between workers of different races 
as necessary for achieving a world free of racism and white privilege, 
given that other areas of life are increasingly segregated.
41
 In contrast 
to Schultz, then, Estlund values affective ties at work primarily for 
instrumental reasons, prioritizing structural change over connections 
experienced by individual workers.  
Although Estlund‘s approach to workplace ties may seem to 
constitute a middle ground between Schultz and Case, in the end 
Estlund‘s approach is much closer to Case‘s than Schultz‘s. Estlund 
recognizes the value of only those workplace relationships that by 
their very nature are consistent with antidiscrimination goals. 
Relationships that may conflict with those goals are not the 
 
(―The lack of adequate protection partially reflects an employment law framework that 
presupposes a world in which workers leave the confines of their private homes and travel to 
public workplaces.‖). 
 38. See generally Schultz, supra note 29.  
 39. Id. at 2136–39.  
 40. The two primary examples are Cynthia Estlund and Noah Zatz. See generally 
CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE 
DEMOCRACY (2003); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection 
for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002). 
 41. ESTLUND, supra note 40, at 9–15, 60–83. 
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workplace bonds that Estlund celebrates.
42
 Like Case, who would 
support all workplace intimacy once we are all ―perfectly bisexual,‖43 
Estlund would appear to support all workplace intimacy in a world 
where racial hierarchy no longer exists.
44
 Until that time, only those 
workplace relationships that challenge, instead of replicate, 
traditional patterns of association will be valuable in Estlund‘s view.  
In sum, with the primary exception of Schultz, legislators and 
legal scholars have explicitly considered relationships at work only to 
the extent that those relationships either threaten or further equality in 
the workplace and the larger society. Legislators and legal scholars 
almost universally view severe or pervasive unwelcome sexual 
advances as constituting impermissible sex discrimination, and 
therefore call for the regulation of such interactions.
45
 Case calls for 
this regulation to go a step farther, to encompass workplace decision-
making based on personal relationships rather than qualifications.
46
 
Legislators have not extended workplace regulation in this manner, 
however, remaining silent about workplace friendships and 
connections that do not operate in explicitly discriminatory ways. 
This legislative silence about most relationships at work likely does 
not reflect a legislative judgment about the value of such 
relationships, but instead likely reflects the general policy of 
deferring to employer prerogatives in areas not tainted by 
impermissible discrimination.
47
 Schultz is therefore largely alone in 
 
 42. Noah Zatz, too, primarily embraces only those forms of solidarity that further Title 
VII‘s antidiscrimination goals. Zatz, supra note 40, at 65–70. 
 43. Case, supra note 26, at 158. 
 44. ESTLUND, supra note 40, at 63–80.  
 45. Of course, there is debate over the scope of this regulation. As previously discussed, 
Schultz expresses concern that employers‘ fear of sexual harassment liability often leads to 
regulation of a much broader range of consensual sexual interactions at work. Schultz, supra 
note 29, at 2087. Janet Halley also takes issue with approaches that assume all unwelcome 
sexual advances in the workplace are problematic. See JANET E. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: 
HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 283–85, 290–303 (2006). At the very least, 
Halley, like Schultz, criticizes the ways that the current construction of sexual harassment law 
regulates behavior that is not necessarily severe, pervasive, and/or unwelcome. Id.  
 46. Case, supra note 26, at 158.  
 47. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (stating that Title 
VII ―eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving 
employers‘ freedom of choice‖ and explaining the Court‘s task as drawing a ―balance between 
employee rights and employer prerogatives‖); see also supra notes 13–15 and accompanying 
text.  
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supporting the freedom to engage in workplace relationships based 
on the value of such relationships to individual employees.
48
  
Under these various legal approaches, workplace relationships are 
evaluated based on their value to individual employers and 
employees or their effect on workplace equality. In turn, legislators 
and legal scholars believe such relationships should be left to 
individual choice, of either the employer or employees, or treated as 
discrimination. Given this state of law, legislators and legal scholars 
have not considered how personal relationships may affect workplace 
dynamics beyond discrimination or whether law should affirmatively 
support at least some forms of workplace intimacy. The next Part 
begins a consideration of these neglected issues by turning to social 
science literature examining workplace intimacy more broadly.  
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK 
Social science literature analyzing workplace intimacy generally 
explores a broader range of connections between personal 
relationships and work than those considered by legislators and legal 
scholars. Like workplace law, some of this analysis considers the 
potential harms of personal relationships at work, albeit mostly from 
the perspective of employers concerned about workplace 
productivity.
49
 The vast majority of the social science literature, 
however, chronicles the ways that relationships at work may lead to 
improved outcomes for employees and employers alike. As Ethan 
Leib summarizes this aspect of the literature: ―Employees with 
friends at the workplace are more efficient than their peers, suffer less 
stress at the office, tend to stay at their jobs longer, and experience 
less job dissatisfaction.‖50 
 
 48. Schultz, supra note 29, at 2191–92. 
 49. See, e.g., Evan M. Berman, Jonathan P. West & Maurice N. Richter, Jr., Workplace 
Relations: Friendship Patterns and Consequences (According to Managers), 62 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 217, 222 (2002); Sharon Foley & Gary N. Powell, Not All is Fair in Love and Work: 
Coworkers’ Preferences for and Responses to Managerial Interventions Regarding Workplace 
Romances, 20 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1043, 1044 (1999); Sharon A. Lobel, Robert E. 
Quinn, Lynda St. Clair & Andrea Warfield, Love Without Sex: The Impact of Psychological 
Intimacy Between Men and Women at Work, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Summer 1994, at 4, 
11. 
 50. ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND 
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Even more interestingly, the social science literature has 
increasingly emphasized the ways that personal relationships are a 
fact of the workplace,
51
 with highly contextual effects.
52
 Viviana 
Zelizer recently wrote: ―When it comes to the positive or negative 
impact of intimacy, the crucial fact is not the sheer presence of 
intimate relations, but the type of relation and its location within the 
larger web of connections within the organization.‖53 Some scholars 
attribute such intimacy to the entrance of married white women into 
the workforce beginning in the 1970s, but in fact ―Americans made 
the workplace a site of social as well as economic life‖ from the start 
of the twentieth century.
54
 This social aspect of work has not been 
 
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 40 (2011) (citing various sources in the fields of sociology 
and labor economics); see also Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimacy in Economic Organizations, in 
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 23, 29–31 (Nina Bandelj ed., 2009) (also citing various 
studies by economic sociologists, organizational analysts, scholars of sociology and the law, 
and specialists in work and occupations). For some earlier studies concluding that work 
relationships have a net positive effect, see Christine M. Riordan & Rodger W. Griffeth, The 
Opportunity for Friendship in the Workplace: An Underexplored Construct, 10 J. BUS. & 
PSYCHOL. 141, 151 (1995) (―[F]riendship within the work environment may be severely 
underrated and underutilized as a condition for individual and organizational effectiveness.‖); 
Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-workers, 72 SOC. FORCES 
843, 850 (1994) (using the 1986 General Society Survey to generalize that ―[f]or millions of 
American workers—approximately half–close friendships are formed among co-workers, 
‗important matters‘ are discussed with them, and such discussions are associated with greater 
job satisfaction‖). 
 51. For a critique of earlier social science studies that instead confined intimacy to the 
home and other private retreats from economic production, including ―free-floating 
friendships,‖ see Marks, supra note 50, at 844–45.  
 52. See, e.g., Christine L. Williams, Patti A. Giuffre & Kirsten Dellinger, Sexuality in the 
Workplace: Organizational Control, Sexual Harassment, and the Pursuit of Pleasure, 25 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 73 (1999) (arguing that sexual activity in the workplace is neither good nor bad but 
instead must be evaluated by considering the consent to such activity and context-specific 
boundaries). 
 53. Zelizer, supra note 50, at 24; see also id. at 25 (defining intimacy as ―privileged 
access to another person‘s attention, information, and trust, all of which would damage the 
person if widely available to other people‖); id. at 33 (stating that ―[s]exual, kinship, and 
friendship relations are all impressively prevalent in workplaces‖ and quoting Deirdre 
McCloskey‘s statement that ―[m]odern capitalist life is love-saturated‖); Gary Alan Fine, 
Friendships in the Work Place, in FRIENDSHIP AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 185 (Valerian J. 
Derlega & Barbara A. Winstead eds., 1986) (discussing how different types of work allow for 
and foster different types of friendships based on the structure of the job, the composition of the 
workforce, the degree to which workers are permitted to be autonomous, and the degree to 
which the job can be left at work instead of pervading off-work hours). 
 54. CLAUDE S. FISCHER, MADE IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CULTURE 
AND CHARACTER 150 (2010); see also id. at 133–34 (describing the formation of workplace ties 
from the beginning of the twentieth century); RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT WORK 200–25 
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limited to one type of workplace, such as white-collar workplaces, 
but instead can pervade multiple forms of work, including factory 
lines.
55
 
Some relationships at work may substitute for intimacy 
traditionally thought to occur within the home. As Stephen Marks 
concluded, ―millions of people probably find in co-workers some 
support, nurturance, companionship, and approbation not available to 
them at home, either because they have no spouse or spouse-like 
partner, or because they get little or no such rewards if they have 
one.‖56 These rewards may also include sex, as recent surveys of 
employees and human resource professionals report that between 40 
and 47 percent of workers have been involved in at least one 
―workplace romance‖ at some point in their working lives.57  
However, relationships at work do not merely possess the 
assumed rewards of relationships at home; in fact, intimacy at work 
may be much different than intimacy at home. Workplace bonds 
constitute ―an expressive subworld that runs parallel to the 
instrumentalities of the job for which one is paid, often using and 
playing off of those instrumentalities to elaborate itself, but not 
restricted to job concerns for its further development.‖58 As such, 
work relationships may be much more defined by workplace 
dynamics than the dynamics of the home. Moreover, workplace 
intimacy necessarily mixes with the work of the workplace, often in 
complex ways. That mixing means that most intimacy at work is 
 
(2001) (compiling and analyzing more than one hundred workplace ethnographies from the 
1930s onward). Of course, the entrance of more married women into the workforce altered the 
social significance of work, which in turn affects the social significance of workplace ties even 
if such ties long pre-dated Title VII. The nature of workplace ties also likely has been affected 
by other social phenomena that have similarly made the workplace of greater importance, 
including the role the workplace has come to play in providing employees with health 
insurance. 
 55. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES 
HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 188 (1997) (chronicling social bonds that developed on a 
factory line, providing ―friends to joke with and confide in‖).  
 56. Marks, supra note 50, at 853; see also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 42 (―Research 
shows that work friends can be as important as family members in helping both men and 
women cope with the blows of life.‖). 
 57. Zelizer, supra note 50, at 35. 
 58. Marks, supra note 50, at 854.  
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neither simply an instrument of workplace success nor irrelevant to 
that success.
59
  
Both the prevalence and varied nature of workplace relationships 
have led social scientists to conclude that ―no practical policy of 
banning or radically containing intimacy is likely to work within 
economic organizations.‖60 Unlike similar arguments made by 
Schultz, however, such conclusions acknowledge the positive aspects 
of workplace relationships beyond the individual expression 
trumpeted by Schultz, as well as the potential harms of such 
relationships beyond the favoritism criticized by Case. As such, the 
social science literature permits a more nuanced consideration of the 
benefits and risks of workplace relationships than is present in the 
legal literature. 
Moreover, these benefits and risks are often intertwined. 
Interviews and surveys conducted by Arlie Hochschild revealed that 
working parents often agreed that ―work feels like home should feel‖ 
because emotional support is more readily available in the workplace 
than at home.
61
 Women in particular may take a job in order to ―take 
out an emotional insurance policy on the uncertainties of home 
life.‖62 This research leads to more complex understandings of the 
benefits of workplace relationships, but it also points to the potential 
for more complex harms, including more complex forms of 
inequality. If female employees experience emotional support and 
intimacy at work, for example, they may be more likely than their 
male colleagues to stay in a given job even if opportunities for 
 
 59. See Rachel L. Morrison, Are Women Tending and Befriending in the Workplace? 
Gender Differences in the Relationship Between Workplace Friendships and Organizational 
Outcomes, 60 SEX ROLES 1, 1 (2009) (―It is assumed that people do not initiate and maintain 
relationships at work simply as a means to assist them in their organizational objectives or work 
activities. Indeed most people, in and out of the work environment, seek to make friends and 
social connections for the intrinsic rewards that these relations provide.‖); Nick Rumens, 
Working at Intimacy: Gay Men’s Workplace Friendships, 15 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 9 (2008) 
(discussing ways that workplace friendships may create a sense of belonging both at work and 
outside of it, thereby improving workplace productivity as well as happiness at work and 
beyond). 
 60. Zelizer, supra note 50, at 35. 
 61. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 200. 
 62. Id. at 201; see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
INTIMATE LIFE: NOTES FROM HOME AND WORK 204 (2003) (―A loss of supportive structure 
around the family may result in a gain for the workplace, and vice versa.‖). 
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workplace advancement are low or nonexistent.
63
 Far from being a 
free choice, this trend may be heavily influenced by gender role 
socialization. Women may value intimacy at work because it is 
unmoored from expectations that women should perform unpaid 
labor in the home and men should be breadwinners. Or women may 
be so used to providing unpaid labor in the home that it is 
unremarkable (to them and others) also to perform unpaid or 
underpaid labor at work.
64
  
Workplace relationships may therefore perpetuate historical forms 
of inequality even in the absence of employer animus or favoritism. 
For example, one general survey found that friendship at work 
―trumped such seemingly obvious employee motivators as pay and 
benefits‖ for both male and female employees.65 More in-depth 
studies have revealed, however, that this is likely more true for 
women than men. In a study of female retail establishment 
employees, one female employee stated: 
The money is just immaterial. If you can‘t establish 
relationships and if you can‘t establish people actually coming 
here, then all of that hard work and selling, getting that 
merchandise in and ordering it, really isn‘t worth it. I guess 
seeing that customers are happy and they‘re leaving and people 
are laughing and having a good time, that is reaping all of the 
benefits of just being friendly and outgoing and knowing that 
they are our number one priority.
66
 
Another study found that ―[w]hen women report increased social 
support, more opportunities for friendships and/or increased 
prevalence of friendships [in the workplace] they were less likely to 
be planning to leave their job; while the friendship variables were not 
 
 63. See, e.g., Rebekah Peeples Massengill, “The Money is Just Immaterial”: Relationality 
on the Retail Shop Floor, in ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF WORK, supra note  50, at 185, 197–200; 
Morrison, supra note 59, at 9–11. 
 64. Cf. Karen Ramsay & Gayle Letherby, The Experience of Academic Non-Mothers in 
the Gendered University, 13 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 25, 35–41 (2006) (finding that mothers 
and non-mothers alike are affected by the ideology of motherhood at work, including being 
perceived as ―natural‖ caregivers). 
 65. Susan Ellingwood, The Collective Advantage, GALLUP MGMT. J., Sept. 15, 2001, http: 
//gmj.gallup.com/content/787/collective-advantage.aspx. 
 66. Massengill, supra note 63, at 197–98. 
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related to intent to leave for men.‖67 The study‘s author thus 
speculated that ―women may perceive friendship as a necessary 
aspect of work, whereas men may see their organizational friendships 
as an added bonus.‖68 
Therefore, although the social science literature emphasizes that 
workplace relationships often affect workplace success, such effects 
consist of more than discrimination or favoritism. Instead, workplace 
friendships may lead to outcomes that are simultaneously positive 
and negative as they promote stability, workplace success, and 
individual employee happiness while also limiting opportunities to 
seek out more lucrative experiences with other employers.  
III. AN AGENDA FOR ALTERNATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES  
Insights from the social science literature discussed above may 
influence legal responses to work relationships in multiple ways. 
Below I analyze three broad directions in which law could move, in 
the process setting forth an agenda for more detailed analyses of 
work relationships in the future. 
A. Personal Relationships Throughout Life and Law  
Both the case law and social science literature reveal that affective 
bonds can and often do occur in various aspects of the workplace and 
throughout individuals‘ working lives.69 Despite this 
acknowledgement, the larger legal system does not contemplate how 
such bonds relate to the bonds celebrated in legally recognized 
families or other forms of personal relationships not explicitly 
recognized by family law. Instead, laws relating to the family and 
laws relating to the workplace remain distinct and different, with 
family law channeling certain affective interactions into marriage and 
particular understandings of the parent-child relationship, and 
employment law largely ignoring affective interactions unless they 
constitute prohibited sexual harassment. 
 
 67. Morrison, supra note 59, at 9.  
 68. Id. at 11. 
 69. See supra notes 13–15, 33–35, 40–44, 49–58 and accompanying text.  
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This legal assignment of intimacy to the family to the exclusion of 
other sites of intimacy may be the best way for law to regulate and 
shape the emotions and dependencies that arise from personal 
relationships. But legal scholars have not examined the 
underpinnings of this intuition or its implications. Family law 
scholars have engaged in intense debates about the boundaries of the 
legal family, largely by asking whether function should supplement 
or even replace formal definitions of the legal family.
70
 That 
emphasis on function, however, generally has not been extended to 
affective interactions that do not look like either marriage or the 
parent-child relationship. In addition, functional approaches have 
ignored affective interactions that take place in locations other than 
the home, even if such interactions embody the care, support, and 
intimacy at the heart of functional definitions of the family. 
In earlier work, I called on family law scholars to extend the 
functional approach to examine the various locations of family 
functions.
71
 I also urged family law scholars to interrogate the 
boundaries of family law, in contrast to the boundaries of the family, 
in order to reveal how family law implicitly regulates relationships, 
such as friendship, that are not included within the boundaries of the 
legal family.
72
 The above examination of relationships at work has 
convinced me that I did not go far enough. My previous 
recommendations are still unduly tied to existing legal definitions of 
family and to common assumptions that personal relationships can 
and should be confined to the domain of family law, however 
defined. Even if family law is expanded to encompass locations 
outside of the home and forms of relationship that traditionally have 
been excluded from family law analysis, a focus on family law 
continues to assign intimacy to the family to the exclusion of other 
aspects of life and law. My earlier work thereby implicitly reinforced 
 
 70. See Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving, and 
Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287–88 (1992–93); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: 
Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270–72 (1991); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian Theory 
of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 576–84. 
 71. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 877–80 
(2007).  
 72. Rosenbury, supra note 8, at 226–29. 
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the state‘s focus on relationships in only one domain, the legal 
family, instead of examining the effects of relationships across all 
social and legal domains.  
Relationships at work challenge that limited focus, thus providing 
an opportunity for legal scholars to examine intimacy in all its forms 
and its interaction with other aspects of life, including work and 
production.
73
 Indeed, relationships at work reveal that affective bonds 
occur both throughout all aspects of daily life and throughout many, 
if not all, areas of law. In future work, I plan to expand upon my 
previous considerations of marriage and friendship
74
 and upon the 
analysis of work relationships in this Essay, in order to lay a 
foundation for a broader analysis of the role of intimacy throughout 
the life course. I see this analysis as flowing from my earlier work, 
but the analysis does not depend on acceptance of all of the 
arguments in that work. 
I will begin by focusing on particular forms of work relationships 
that both mimic and challenge traditional notions of family intimacy, 
most prominently the relationships of ―work wives‖ or ―day 
spouses.‖75 I hope other scholars will similarly take advantage of the 
example of relationships at work to begin a larger interrogation of the 
effects of confining legal considerations of intimacy to family. 
Limiting explicit legal consideration to those bonds that resemble 
family relationships shapes our understandings of the bonds outside 
 
 73. Family law scholars have already done this in one sense by incorporating the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) into their analysis. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security 
Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 17 
(2004). However, most analysis of the FMLA focuses on the work/family balance I critique. 
See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the 
FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL‘Y 193 (2004); Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an 
Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
1443; Julie Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law 
and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010). As such, the existing scholarship 
does not examine how the FMLA may affect relationships between coworkers by providing 
legal support for one type of intimate relationship occurring outside of work while remaining 
silent about intimate relationships occurring within the workplace. 
 74. Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 809 (2010); Rosenbury, supra note 8; Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: 
Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227. 
 75. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives (Apr. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
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of that resemblance, potentially overvaluing some forms of intimacy 
and undervaluing others. By examining affective bonds outside the 
comfort of the core zones of family law, I hope family law as a field 
will move beyond analysis of types of intimacy that can be colonized 
into family forms, and thus beyond the attempts to define, and 
regulate, the legal family that have been so prominent in family law.
76
 
In so doing, family law scholars may destabilize their own 
identity, as a move away from family toward intimacy more 
diversely-defined challenges what is meant by family law at all. I 
urge family law scholars to take this risk, and even to welcome it. 
The separation of family law from employment law or other areas of 
law necessarily contributes to simplistic categorizations of everyday 
life as family or work, intimacy or production, love or money. Legal 
scholars in and out of family law have recently begun to challenge 
such categorizations by engaging in compelling analyses of the ways 
that legal definitions of family play a role in various other areas of 
law, from criminal prosecution,
77
 defenses,
78
 and sentencing,
79
 to 
immigration,
80
 and government conflict-of-interest rules.
81
 As such, 
traditional family law considerations have been supplemented by 
―family and the law‖ approaches.  
This move toward ―family and the law‖ is a promising 
development, but such approaches still construct family as separate 
from most aspects of law, as the word ―and‖ implies. Now is the time 
for scholars of family and employment law, as well as scholars in 
other areas of law, to build upon these approaches in order to 
challenge the legal assignment of relationships, affection, and 
intimacy to the legally defined family as opposed to other legal 
 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 70–72. 
 77. Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal 
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253 (2009) (examining the relationship 
between statutory rape laws and marriage laws). 
 78. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 6–9, 43–45 (2009).  
 79. Id. at 12–16, 48–53. 
 80. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1625 (2007) (examining various regulations of marriage in immigration law). 
 81. Susan Frelich Appleton & Robyn M. Rimmer, Power Couples: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, 
and the State of Their Unions, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 207 (2007) (using the example of 
power couples to examine the relationship between family law and government conflict-of-
interest laws). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:117 
 
 
domains. Indeed, various forms of intimacy could be a subject of 
every law school class. Conceptions of family law may blur into 
other forms of legal analysis as a result, but that is likely a cause for 
celebration rather than fear. The boundaries between family and other 
aspects of life are more blurred and fluid than is reflected in current 
legal doctrine, and such boundaries might become even more fluid if 
scholars interrogate and challenge the regulatory force of current 
legal definitions of family in all aspects of life and law.  
B. Personal Relationships and the Quest for Workplace Equality 
Employment discrimination doctrine and scholarship also reflect 
simplistic categorizations of everyday life as family or work, 
intimacy or production, love or money. Existing doctrine that largely 
defers to employer prerogatives with respect to workplace 
relationships
82
 serves as another reminder that the state explicitly 
supports and regulates personal relationships only when they occur in 
non-work domains. The one personal interaction governed by Title 
VII rather than employer prerogatives—sexual harassment—is not 
considered a relationship at all but instead is defined as a 
discriminatory power dynamic. Similarly, scholarship calling for 
more regulation of workplace relationships in order to combat 
favoritism assumes that merit can always be separated from 
relationship and thus, that production can and should be separated 
from intimacy.
83
  
In many ways, these approaches to workplace relationships reflect 
underlying themes and tensions within all of workplace 
antidiscrimination law. The general deference to employer 
prerogatives in all hiring, firing, and promotion decisions unless 
those decisions are discriminatory assumes that discriminatory intent 
is a phenomenon distinct from all other workplace dynamics. 
Pursuant to that assumption, the workplace will promote equality so 
long as assessments of individual merit are not tainted by animus. 
Some scholars have recognized the limitations of this assumption, 
calling for a structural turn toward workplace equality that moves 
 
 82. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
 83. See, e.g., Case, supra note 26.  
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beyond litigation interrogating the intent of employers‘ decision-
makers.
84
 Other scholars believe that intent can be better understood 
and combated within the context of larger workplace dynamics, in 
large part by uncovering the ways that implicit bias, as opposed to 
animus, can affect employment decisions.
85
 The call to eliminate 
favoritism at work can be seen as a subset of this attempt to eliminate 
implicit bias, as workplace relationships are thought to favor some 
groups over others given patterns of intimacy outside of work.  
More in-depth examinations of relationships at work like the ones 
I propose are likely to provide new insights into these themes and 
tensions, particularly if such examinations move beyond the 
characterization of such relationships as either benign or 
discriminatory. Employment decisions that take personal 
relationships into account are not the product of animus, but that does 
not mean that such relationships are, or should be, irrelevant to the 
quest for workplace equality. Indeed, by acknowledging the various 
ways that relationships at work may influence workplace 
opportunities, I hope to begin new conversations about the ways 
antidiscrimination law might move beyond an animus-based 
framework.  
First and foremost, workplace ties challenge the notion, embraced 
by lawmakers and scholars alike, that employees are autonomous 
wage-earners who simply need an opportunity to display their 
―individual merit‖ to workplace decision-makers. Instead, many 
employees rely on the support of others to make a living and succeed 
in the workplace. Employees therefore are not autonomous and their 
―merit‖ is not solely the product of individual ability. Feminist legal 
theorists have long acknowledged the support that many male 
workers receive from sources outside of the workplace, from stay-at-
home wives or even working wives and other family members, and 
the ways that workers who do not have such support are often 
 
 84. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 85. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 969, 978–88 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497–
1535 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1027–52 
(2006). 
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hampered.
86
 But these theorists have not examined the support that 
workers do, or do not, receive from personal relationships within the 
workplace itself.
87
 Focusing on relationships within the workplace, 
rather than outside of it, may better challenge the embrace of 
individual merit that continues to pervade most of the theorizing 
about workplace antidiscrimination law. 
Second, such a focus on workplace relationships permits analysis 
of the ways that supportive ties within the workplace may constitute a 
crucial component of workplace success. Of course, a focus on 
favoritism also recognizes that relationships within the workplace 
may be a condition of success in the workplace, as critiques of the 
―old-boys network‖ emphasize. The social science literature reveals, 
however, that another layer of support often underlies workplace 
success, a form of support that goes beyond making the right 
connections or ―sucking up‖ to the right people.88 Workplace friends 
instead may serve as trusted sounding boards or otherwise may help 
workers get through daily experiences of job stress and anxiety. As 
such, workers often need supportive relationships both at home and at 
work in order to succeed in the workplace. 
Third, this analysis of the importance of workplace ties may have 
consequential implications for legal rules designed to guarantee equal 
opportunity in the workplace. Theories of workplace equality that rest 
on permitting individual merit to rise above irrational discrimination 
are likely to be inadequate unless they consider which employees are 
most likely to receive support from workplace relationships and how 
that support contributes, and should contribute, to employers‘ 
 
 86. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 17–49 (2004); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4–6 (2000). 
 87. For example, Joan Williams, discussed infra text accompanying note 96, recognizes 
that the carework women have traditionally performed within the home has effects outside of 
the home, in particular by serving as the (feminine) work against which (masculine) wage work 
is defined, but Williams overlooks the ways that carework also is performed outside of the 
home. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as 
Tradition, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1442, 1474–76 (2001). Some of Martha Fineman‘s work 
contains this blind spot as well, see, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 86, at 188–95, although her 
more recent work seeks to analyze vulnerability arising in more varied contexts, see Martha 
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
 88. See supra Part II. 
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assessments of employees‘ merit. In future considerations of specific 
workplace relationships, I plan to consider which employees are most 
likely to engage in reciprocal supportive relationships at work, which 
employees are most likely to receive such support but not give it, 
which employees are most likely to give such support but not receive 
it, and which employees are excluded from workplace relationships 
altogether. In addition, I will consider whether certain groups of 
employees, particularly employees of color and gay and lesbian 
employees, need to do more ―identity work‖ to participate in such 
relationships than do employees who are white and straight.
89
 If, 
despite Estlund‘s hopes,90 workplace relationships track even loosely 
the dominance of gendered heterosexual and intraracial relationships 
outside of the workplace, then antidiscrimination law must take such 
workplace relationships into account.  
This accounting likely will need to go well beyond a focus on the 
favoritism of individual decision-makers. Intimacy and affection in 
the workplace generally cannot be traced to a set of people in power 
and then eliminated. Rather, as Zelizer and others emphasize,
91
 
intimacy often pervades the workplace, occurring not just in the 
vertical supervisor-supervisee relationships, upon which critics of 
favoritism focus, but also in co-worker relationships, relationships 
with customers and vendors, and the like. Moreover, much of this 
intimacy can produce better outcomes for both employers and 
employees.
92
 Beyond the arguments of Case and Schultz, the task of 
workplace antidiscrimination law is to analyze the ways that such 
intimacy supports or harms the success of individual employees and 
to determine whether that support and harm tracks traditional patterns 
of inclusion and exclusion. If it does, then antidiscrimination law 
must move well beyond a focus on individual merit, favoritism, or 
animus in order to develop a theory that incorporates the importance 
of personal relationships in the workplace and beyond.  
 
 89. This is an extension of the identity work first discussed by Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 
(2000). I am indebted to Carbado and Gulati for the title of this Essay. 
 90. See supra text accompanying note 41.  
 91. See supra notes 50–58. 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
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C. Personal Relationships Across Public/Private Divides 
Many theorists, including Estlund and feminists of various 
persuasions, have posited the workplace as a site of liberation from 
private and societal discrimination.
93
 As Hochschild revealed, work is 
a place where women in particular are often freed from the gendered 
caregiving expectations that pervade the family home.
94
 The analysis 
above, however, challenges the suggestion that care is therefore 
irrelevant to the workplace. Instead, care and support can be just as 
crucial in the workplace as they are in the home, even if that care and 
support is of a different nature in the two realms.
95
 It seems unlikely, 
then, that gendered and racialized patterns of care completely 
disappear in the workplace. Dynamics of care cross the divides 
between public and private realms, problematizing any strategy for 
equality that relies on the distinctiveness of those realms rather than 
their similarities.  
Joan Williams and others have already challenged the idea that 
work can be a site of women‘s liberation by analyzing the ways that 
the ideal worker is assumed to have no caregiving responsibilities 
outside of work that may interfere with work duties, an assumption 
that rarely matches the realities of women‘s lives.96 These advocates 
of ―work/family balance‖ have made important contributions to 
theories of workplace equality by analyzing the ways in which family 
care responsibilities affect work opportunities, but their rhetoric of 
balance assumes a separation between work and family, and between 
production and care. In this view, care is a factor external to the 
workplace, but employers must take such care into account in order 
to achieve gender equality within the workplace. Employers are 
therefore left with the message that dynamics of care within the 
 
 93. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 40; Meredith Render, The Man, The State and You: 
The Role of the State in Regulating Gender Hierarchies, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 
73, 110–15 (2006); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1905–09 (2000). 
 94. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 200; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 62, at 204. 
 95. See supra Part II. 
 96. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 64–72; Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: 
Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 
1801–11 (2007); Williams, supra note 87, at 1474–76. 
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workplace either do not exist or are irrelevant to women‘s success 
unless they constitute animus-based discrimination. 
By instead exploring the ways that care permeates divides 
between work and family, legal scholars may glean new insights 
about appropriate legal responses to personal relationships, 
dependency, and individual choice throughout various aspects of life. 
For instance, the social science literature chronicled above challenges 
the common assumptions that family relationships and friendships 
outside of the workplace are ends in and of themselves, whereas work 
relationships are instrumental, existing solely to further individual 
financial or career success. To the contrary, employees may pursue 
workplace relationships for the ―intrinsic rewards‖ of such ties,97 
whereas some family and dating relationships and some friendships 
may be quite transactional.
98
 Despite this fluidity of purpose, law 
affirmatively supports only those relationships upon which it bestows 
the legal status of family. Just as I have explored how law could 
support friendship in ways that do not depend on collapsing 
friendship into family,
99
 I hope to explore in future work ways that 
law might support and monitor workplace relationships without 
collapsing them into family.  
The state may have an interest in supporting and monitoring 
workplace relationships in some fashion, instead of deferring to 
employer prerogatives, because of the dependencies that may arise 
within such relationships. The state has long justified its recognition 
of certain family relationships to the exclusion of others as necessary 
to privatize the dependency of certain family members, traditionally 
the dependencies of women and children on their husbands and 
 
 97. Morrison, supra note 59, at 1. 
 98. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 47–56, 94–147 (2005) 
(discussing ways that intimate relationships often involve market exchanges, thus leading to 
commodification in family law and coupling not explicitly affected by family law); Rosenbury 
& Rothman, supra note 74, at 845–46. 
 99. See Rosenbury, supra note 8, at 226–33. In this respect, I agree with Ethan Leib that 
friendship should not be subsumed within family. See LEIB, supra note 50, at 15–19. However, 
that does not mean, as Leib suggests, that the law should purge all sexual relationships from the 
friendship category. Instead, sex can be aligned with friendship just as easily as it can be 
aligned with marriage or family, and there is no need to prohibit that fluidity unless one wants 
to reinforce compulsory heteronormativity.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:117 
 
 
fathers.
100
 Workplace dependencies are not as obvious as these family 
dependencies, but they likely exist on some level. Indeed, the state‘s 
deference to employer prerogatives may in fact be another form of 
the privatization of dependency, whereby employers are largely left 
alone so long as they pay wages that keep their employees from 
needing state assistance.
101
 In other words, employers provide the 
wages that permit families to exist without direct financial support 
from the state. If, in turn, workplace success depends on relationships 
in the workplace, scholars could make strong arguments about why 
the state should care about such relationships within the existing 
framework of the state‘s desire to privatize dependency. 
Determining the contours of potential state support and 
monitoring of relationships at work will likely require more radical 
interventions. My future projects will lay out various possibilities for 
legal treatment of workplace intimacies, with a focus on treatments 
that recognize the importance of such intimacies without reinforcing 
gendered and racialized patterns of care and intimacy that occur 
outside of the workplace. Part of that task involves asking who 
benefits from workplace relationships and who does not, as set forth 
in the previous section, thus situating such relationships within larger 
societal structures. In particular, I want to mitigate the risk that those 
 
 100. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 
(2000) (recounting how the state recognized marriage as an incentive for individual men to 
assume private responsibility for women and children in an era when women had few political 
and economic rights); Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the 
Traditional Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 533 (1998) (discussing the state‘s general use of marriage 
to privatize the dependency of both children and wives); Brenda Cossman, Contesting 
Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y 
& L. 415, 417 (2005) (―More specifically, society has called upon family law to address the 
economic needs of women and children at precisely the moment when it is dismantling the 
welfare state and public financial assistance has become increasingly scarce.‖). 
 101. The Supreme Court has long relied on this rationale to uphold minimum wage laws. 
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (―The exploitation of a class of 
workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively 
defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well 
being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. What these workers lose 
in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.‖). For critiques of this rationale for the minimum 
wage, see Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE 
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA‘S LABOR 
MARKET 31, 57–58 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008); Noah Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a 
Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 
9–23.  
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work relationships that most resemble traditional family 
relationships, rooted in heteronormativity, gender hierarchy, and 
racial homophily, will be privileged by employers and employees 
alike.
102
  
But even more so, the task will require an examination of the 
interplay between individual workers‘ choices and employer 
practices. Some workers may want to stay in a particular job to 
maintain workplace relationships, among other factors, but may not 
be able to do so because of layoffs or other employer practices. In 
this situation, most observers see employer practices trumping 
individual choice. Other workers may choose relationships at work 
that track societal inequality instead of freeing them from it. 
Observers generally view this situation as solely the product of 
individual choice, as opposed to employer practices, but the 
dynamics may, in fact, be more complicated.  
For example, as discussed in Part II, some women, unlike most 
men, may stay in a particular workplace instead of pursuing more 
lucrative alternatives in order to maintain workplace relationships. 
Current legal doctrine simply chalks this dynamic up to individual 
preferences without interrogating how the structure of the workplace 
may shape those preferences. Once analyzed in more depth, however, 
it is possible to see individual choice as shaped by the nature of the 
workplace and the market more generally. Women may subordinate 
their economic interests at work in order to maintain workplace ties, 
thereby replicating patterns of female sacrifice present in the home.
103
 
Or they may choose to value intimacy in response to stressful, 
unstable, or otherwise problematic working conditions.
104
 
Relationships at work may make work more bearable, and more 
human, challenging the idea that those relationships are solely the 
product of individual choice. 
 
 102. Despite Estlund‘s hopes, racial homophily is a likely possibility in the workplace. See 
generally Kelly A. Mollica, Barbara Gray & Linda K. Treviño, Racial Homophily and Its 
Persistence in Newcomers’ Social Networks, 14 ORG. SCI. 123 (2003); Miller McPherson, Lynn 
Smith-Lovin & James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 415 (2001). 
 103. See Rosenbury, supra note 74, at 1278–82. 
 104. See Massengill, supra note 63, at 195–200; Morrison, supra note 59, at 9–11. 
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Moreover, such relationship choices may also be influenced by 
the dynamics of the home. Although women may not be wholly 
liberated from care expectations in the workplace, such expectations 
at work may be preferable to those in the home. Women may actually 
enjoy the opportunity to experience emotional ties in the workplace 
that are less subsumed by domesticity and dependent care.
105
 That 
enjoyment does not necessarily mean, however, that women who 
forego work opportunities to maintain workplace ties either are freely 
choosing lower wages or are falsely conscious. Instead, their work 
trajectories may be the product of a complex combination of 
individual choice, the structural constraints of home and work, and 
the relationships that both mediate and contribute to those 
constraints.
106
  
In these ways, considering the dynamics of care that flow between 
the public and private divides of work and home may unearth new 
sources of inequality and new strategies for combating that 
inequality. Such strategies will likely be most successful if they do 
not focus on individual animus or choice to the exclusion of societal 
structures, or vice versa. Rather, blurring the public/private divide in 
this manner also requires a blurring of the divide between societal 
inequalities and individual preferences. To do so most effectively, 
employment discrimination scholars, family law scholars, and other 
legal scholars must work together to examine the myriad roles of 
personal relationships across traditional legal divisions.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay sets forth the mere beginnings of an agenda for 
potential legal responses to personal relationships in the workplace. 
This preliminary consideration reveals, however, that relationships at 
work are rarely motivated exclusively by love or money, to use the 
terms of this symposium volume. Instead, all personal relationships, 
regardless of location, are the product of a complex mix of need and 
 
 105. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 55, at 200; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 62, at 204.  
 106. For discussion of similar dynamics that may influence women‘s choices to seek out 
certain jobs, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial 
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of 
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815–38 (1990).  
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affection, and of individual choice, structural constraints, and societal 
privilege and inequality. If scholars and lawmakers believe the state 
has an interest in intimate life, they must think across the divides of 
home and work, intimacy and production, and connection and 
individuality. I look forward to future explorations of the ways that 
working relationships may thus provide paths toward new legal 
conceptualizations of equality, freedom, and community for 
individuals in all aspects of life. 
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